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SUMMARY
In December 2012, prompted by the proposed purchase of Nexen by the Chinese SOE CNOOC, the federal
government announced revised guidelines for investments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the oil sands.
Declaring the sale marked “the end of a trend and not the beginning of a trend,” Prime Minister Stephen Harper
explained how the government would approach such decisions in the future, including placing the onus on
foreign investors to demonstrate how deals would be of net benefit to Canada, as well as granting the industry
minister the discretion to accept or deny proposed deals.  
Accounting for five per cent of Canadian GDP, $28 billion in government revenue and three per cent of all jobs
nationwide, the oil sands are an integral component of Canada’s economy.  The sector has long relied on foreign
capital to finance projects, meaning that any move to deter outside investment could have profound
consequences for the development of this critical economic asset.   
In this paper, the authors examine the impact of this policy change by measuring the stock returns of
firms operating in the oil sands. Employing an event study analysis, they find empirical evidence that the
government’s policy change has resulted in the material destruction of shareholder wealth, particularly in the
case of the smaller oil companies.  What is more, given the composition of the global oil industry has changed
to one where SOEs dominate both reserves and production, is this a policy Canada can afford in the long term?
“When we say that Canada is open for business, we do not mean that Canada is for sale to foreign
governments.” 
- Prime Minister Stephen Harper, December 7, 2012
“…going forward, the [industry] minister will find the acquisition of control of a Canadian oil-sands
business by a state-owned enterprise to be of net benefit, only in an exceptional circumstance.” 
- Prime Minister Stephen Harper, December 7, 2012
“A year after the new Investment Canada Act rules were announced in December 2012, investment
dollars from state-owned enterprises have essentially stopped flowing into the bitumen extraction
business. Energy-directed foreign direct investment – of which SOEs play an important role – fell off
a cliff in 2013, declining 92 per cent year-to-year from $27 billion to $2 billion. These are very
worrisome statistics for a nation highly dependent on foreign investment to fund its capital-intensive
resource industries.”
- Sebation Gault, December 2, 2013 Published in Alberta Oil Magazine
† The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the anonymous referees.
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LES EFFETS DES RESTRICTIONS À 
L’INVESTISSEMENT ÉTRANGER SUR LES 
RENDEMENTS BOURSIERS DES ENTREPRISES  
QUI EXPLOITENT LES SABLES BITUMINEUX†
Eugene Beaulieu et Matthew M. Saunders
RÉSUMÉ
En décembre 2012, dans la foulée du projet d’achat de Nexen par la société d’État chinoise CNOOC, le gouvernement 
fédéral a annoncé des lignes directrices révisées relatives aux investissements des sociétés d’État dans l’exploitation 
des sables bitumineux. Après avoir déclaré que la vente « ne marque pas le début d’une tendance, mais bien 
la fin d’une tendance », le Premier ministre Stephen Harper a expliqué la façon dont le gouvernement traiterait 
dorénavant pareilles décisions : entre autres, il fera reposer sur l’investisseur étranger le fardeau de démontrer 
qu’une transaction représente un bénéfice net pour le Canada, et il conférera au ministre de l’Industrie le pouvoir 
discrétionnaire d’accepter ou de refuser les transactions proposées.
L’industrie des sables bitumineux — qui correspond à cinq pour cent du PIB du Canada, à 28 milliards de dollars en 
recettes publiques et à trois pour cent de tous les emplois à l’échelle nationale — fait partie intégrante de l’économie 
canadienne. Sachant que ce secteur dépend depuis longtemps des capitaux étrangers pour le financement de ses 
projets, toute initiative visant à décourager l’investissement étranger pourrait avoir des répercussions profondes sur 
le développement économique de cet actif économique essentiel.
Dans le présent article, les auteurs examinent les effets de ce changement stratégique en mesurant les rendements 
boursiers des entreprises qui exploitent les sables bitumineux. À partir de l’analyse d’une étude de cas, données 
empiriques à l’appui, ils montrent que le changement stratégique du gouvernement a entraîné la destruction 
matérielle de la valeur actionnariale, en particulier pour les sociétés pétrolières de petite taille. En outre, dans le 
contexte d’une nouvelle composition de l’industrie pétrolière mondiale où les sociétés d’État dominent les réserves 
et la production, le Canada a-t-il vraiment les moyens d’appliquer une telle politique à long terme?
« Quand on dit que le Canada est ouvert aux affaires, nous ne voulons pas dire que le Canada est à vendre aux 
gouvernements étrangers. »
- Stephen Harper, Premier Ministre du Canada, 7 décembre 2012
« À l’avenir, le ministre [de l’Industrie] jugera que l’acquisition du contrôle d’une compagnie canadienne 
opérant dans les sables bitumineux par une société d’État étrangère sera d’un bénéfice net seulement dans 
des circonstances exceptionnelles. »
- Stephen Harper, Premier Ministre du Canada, 7 décembre 2012
« Un an après l’annonce des nouvelles règles de la Loi sur Investissement Canada en décembre 2012, les 
sociétés d’État avaient pratiquement cessé d’investir dans les activités d’extraction des sables bitumineux. Les 
investissements directs étrangers dans le secteur de l’énergie — où les sociétés d’État jouent un rôle important 
— ont chuté drastiquement en 2013, passant de 27 à 2 milliards de dollars, soit une baisse de 92 pour cent 
d’une année sur l’autre. Ces statistiques sont très inquiétantes pour une nation qui dépend fortement des 
investissements étrangers pour financer ses industries de capital fondées sur les ressources. » [traduction]
- Sebation Gault, 2 décembre 2013, publié dans Alberta Oil Magazine
† 
L’auteur tient à remercier les lecteurs critiques anonymes de leurs commentaires pertinents.
INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2012, following the close of markets, Prime Minister Harper announced the
approval of the acquisition of the Canadian energy firm Nexen by the Chinese state-owned
enterprise (SOE) China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). During his press
conference, the prime minister announced revised guidelines intended to halt further oil sands
acquisitions by SOEs, stating outright that the decision on CNOOC was “the end of a trend and
not the beginning of a trend.”1 Specifically, the announcement indicated that, in future,
investments by foreign SOEs to acquire control of a Canadian oil sands business would only be
approved on an exceptional basis. The industry minister would be responsible for monitoring
SOE transactions throughout the economy to determine whether they are of likely net benefit to
Canada, and transactions would continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. The purpose of
this paper is to examine the impact of this policy change on stock prices of firms operating in
the oil sands. 
The revised policy guidelines have had their intended effect on SOE investment. In 2013, only a
single SOE deal was announced. The deal, which took place outside of the oil sands sector, was
worth approximately $320 million, considerably less than the $28 billion in SOE investment that
flowed into Canada in 2012.2 According to Jim Prentice, a former industry minister under Prime
Minister Harper, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the Canadian energy sector, where SOEs
have been major players, “dropped off dramatically”3 following the announced changes to the
Investment Canada Act (ICA). Prentice notes that FDI into the Canadian energy sector declined
92 per cent in 2013 year-to-year from $27 billion to $2 billion. As we discuss below, other
sources of investment have failed to materialize in the industry. Although investment declined in
the industry following the announced changes to the ICA, there is an important debate on the
cause of the decline, and on the impact of the decline in investment on the industry. On the one
hand, some observers like Prentice argue that the new rules have contributed to the decline.
Others have argued that other challenges in the industry led to the reduction in investment,
including higher capital and operating costs, increased environmental regulations, the emergence
of other investment options outside of the oil sands and delays in building the infrastructure
needed to get the product to the market.  According to Grant Ukrainetz from the Korean SOE
KNOC, other challenges have contributed to reduced investment in the sector. 
1 Government of Canada, “Government of Canada Releases Policy Statement and Revised Guidelines for Investments
by State-Owned Enterprises,” news release, December 7, 2012.  http://news.gc.ca/web/article-
en.do?crtr.sj1D=&crtr.mnthndVl=3&mthd=advSrch&crtr.dpt1D=&nid=711489&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=
2008&crtr.kw=Policy%2BStatement%2Band%2BRevised%2BGuidelines%2Bfor%2BInvestments%2Bby%2BStateO
wned%2BEnterprises&crtr.dyStrtVl=26&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=2&crtr.page=1&crtr.yrndVl=2013&crtr.dyndVl
=27 (accessed June 5, 2014)
2 On January 20, 2014, Chinese state-owned Yanchang Petroleum International Limited completed the acquisition of
Novus Energy for $320 million.
3 Prentice, Jim, “Sustaining the Canadian Advantage,” Address to the Oil and Money Conference, October 1, 2013.
https://www.cibc.com/ca/pdf/investor/prentice-oil-money-london-oct-2013-en.pdf (accessed June 5, 2014).
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“Capital cost pressures in the oil sands have tripled, operating costs in the oil sands
at least doubled, we had a change in the oil sands royalty regime, we had greater
environmental regulations, costs of compliance have increased, we had continued
delays in pipelines that allow us to move products out to maximize revenue, (there
is) negative public sentiment toward the oil sands, plus you have the emergence of
other opportunities in the U.S. and elsewhere.”4
Whether, and the extent to which, the changes in the ICA adversely affected the oil sands
industry is an empirical question. However, until now, we have relied on anecdotal evidence
and there is no empirical evidence on the impact of the policy change on the industry. In this
paper, we employ an event study analysis to empirically examine the impact of the 2012
announcement on the stock returns of firms operating in the sector. The advantage of the event
study approach is that it allows one to empirically examine the stock market reaction to the
regulatory change to assess the degree to which the regulations affected the firms. The analysis
is based on the assumption that markets are efficient, and therefore, the impacts of the
regulation are capitalized into the share prices and other determinants of the share prices are
controlled for in the analysis. This approach is widely used in the finance literature to examine
the impact of changes in regulation on firm performance.  This is an empirical approach that
allows us to control for other factors that may have affected stock returns in the sector.  
Although the policy change specifically targets controlling interests by SOEs, it is possible that
the new restrictions could have unintended consequences on capital costs and investment in the
industry more broadly. We posit that the policy changes could have implications for all forms
of financing in the oil sands sector. According to our hypothesis, reducing foreign direct
investment, a complementary source of capital, decreases the overall supply of capital to the oil
sands sector, and therefore, aggregate capital becomes more expensive. Moreover, there are
other peripheral considerations to the revised policy guidelines that potentially make financing
more difficult and expensive for oil sands firms. For example, in the capital-intensive oil
industry with large fixed and sunk costs, oil sands firms, especially the smaller oil sands firms
known as juniors, typically engage in joint ventures (JVs) for their projects. It is possible that
the policy changes have impacted this practice even though the intent was to eliminate
acquisitions in controlling interests, not JVs. This is because it is commonplace in the event of
default in a JV agreement to compensate the non-defaulting party by absorbing the defaulting
party’s interest in a given project. However, the revised guidelines prohibit acquisitions of
control by an SOE in the oil sands sector, unless the circumstances are exceptional. This
constraint on a traditional form of compensation due to a default may deter SOEs from
entering into JV partnerships with oil sands firms. Although we do not directly examine this
channel of the impact of the ICA policy because we do not have data on JV activity, our
analysis allows us to directly examine the impact on stock prices. The impact of limiting access
to capital will be capitalized into the stock prices of the firms affected. It is likely that the
unintended consequences on JVs will impact junior oil sands firms more than the
intermediates/seniors. By disentangling the revised guidelines’ impact on the juniors and the
intermediates/seniors, we are able to examine whether these different types of firms were
impacted differently. 
4 Claudia Cattaneo, “Oil sands investment slowing because of tough market, not new SOE rules, execs say,” Financial
Post, April 4, 2014. Accessed June 5, 2014 http://business.financialpost.com/2014/04/04/oil-sands-investment-
slowing-because-of-tough-market-not-new-soe-rules-execs-say/?__lsa=1d41-0d6e
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3In particular, using the event study framework, we examine whether the policy change resulted
in negative abnormal returns for oil sands firms. We find that the changes to the ICA reduce
the stock returns of oil sands companies and that the negative impact was much larger on the
juniors. These results are robust to different model specifications and control for other factors
that could be affecting the sector.5 We argue that the impact of the policy changes, and
subsequent reduction in oil sands investment, has increased the cost of capital and the ability of
oil sands firms to raise funds. That we find a larger (negative) impact on the oil sands juniors
reflects the fact that they are more reliant on external sources of financing due to limited
internal cash flow. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that other financing options,
such as JVs, have become collateral damage from the changes to the ICA.
This is the first empirical paper to examine the impact of the ICA changes on firms operating
in the oil sands. Although we focus on the impact of the policy on share prices, the negative
impact has broader implications for the oil sector and the Canadian economy. In the next
section we provide a more detailed discussion of the oil sands industry and Canada’s foreign
investment policy. We point out that the industry requires large amounts of investment beyond
what a small capital market like Canada can supply. Canada’s historical reliance on foreign
investment is particularly acute in the capital-intensive natural resource sector. A policy that
limits capital into this sector has historically done damage to the sector and to the Canadian
economy. In the concluding section, we attempt to put the recent policy into a broader context.
We argue that the broader implications of the policy for the Canadian economy could put
employment and social programs at risk as it negatively affects the growth of a sector directly
responsible for five per cent of Canada’s GDP. We do not, however, measure the impact on real
economic variables, such as employment, leaving that instead to future research.
BACKGROUND ON THE OIL SANDS AND INVESTMENT POLICY
Canada ranks third in the world (after only Venezuela and Saudi Arabia)6 in proven oil
reserves, with 97 per cent of its 174 billion barrels reserves found in the oil sands. Current oil
sands production is approximately 1.7 million barrels per day,7 representing a fraction of the
total recoverable resource base. Projects in the oil sands are exceptional in three important
regards: they have long reserve lives; they are capitally intense with large fixed costs, including
significant initial outlays required prior to first production; and, due to economies of scale, they
require significant investment to advance to an efficient scale of operations with long-time
horizons to realize a return on investment.8 Historically, uncertainty has been the greatest
deterrent to development in the sector.9
5 For more detail on the empirical analysis, including robustness checks, please refer to a longer and more technical
version of this paper that is currently available as a working paper: Eugene Beaulieu and Matthew Saunders, “The
Impact of Foreign Investment Policy on Stock Returns of Oil Sands Companies,” Working Paper 2014-46, Department
of Economics, University of Calgary, 2014. http://econ.ucalgary.ca/research/workingpapers/2014/2014-46
6 Source: US Energy Information Agency: http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view=reserves
7 Source: Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers: http://www.capp.ca/library/statistics/basic/Pages/default.aspx
8 Paul Chastko, “Anonymity and Ambivalence: The Canadian and American Oil Industries and the Emergence of
Continental Oil,” The Journal of American History 99 (2012): 166-176. 
9 For an explanation of how Canadian government policy has created uncertainty in the country’s investment climate,
see Chastko, “Anonymity and Ambivalence,” 166-176; and Paul Chastko, Developing Alberta's Oil Sands: From
Karl Clark to Kyoto (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007). 
The Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI) forecasts that to achieve full development, oil
sands projects will require approximately $100 billion in capital investment through 2019.10
Prior to the revised guidelines, the trend was one of increasing SOE investment in the oil
sands, with Asian acquirers, almost exclusively SOE type entities, as the dominant providers of
foreign direct investment. Figure 1 provides an overview of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)
activity in the Canadian oil sands from 1999-2014. The figure presents the number and the
value of the transactions by year, the price of oil and the share of Asian acquirers in the
transactions. Although the share of Asian acquirers does not specifically measure SOE activity,
it is safe to infer that the Asia numbers do reflect SOE activity in the sector. 
Still, despite the acceleration of SOE investment into the oil sands sector depicted in Figure 1,
SOE ownership of the oil sands resource is currently immaterial. According to a recent report
by IHS-CERA, total SOE ownership accounted for six per cent of oil sands production in
2012, slightly above the Statistics Canada estimate.11 That same report points out that the
United States is the dominant provider of capital to the oil sands, with American citizens
controlling 54 per cent of production-weighted ownership and American corporations
controlling a further 29 per cent.12 Chinese FDI outflows are projected to continue to increase
in the short-medium term. According to Dobson, looking just at its global stock of FDI (and
there is a great deal of uncertainty about the numbers due to the use of tax havens and
platforms in Hong Kong), it is generally accepted that this global stock is somewhere around
six per cent of China’s GDP and 12th largest in global terms.13 It is important to note that
China, as measured by flows, was the world’s third largest outward investor in 2012, behind
Japan and the U.S. The point is that if the stock ratio were to be maintained as the Chinese
economy doubles in size by 2020, its global stock would grow to $700 billion, which is similar
to those of Canada and Japan today. More bullish estimates put the stock at $1-2 trillion.
Changes to the ICA essentially eliminate this source of capital from investing in controlling
interests in the Canadian oil sands.
10 Dinara Millington and Carlos A. Murillo, Canadian Oil Sands Supply Costs and Development Projects (2012-2046),
Study No. 133, (Calgary: Canadian Energy Research Institute, 2013).
11 IHS CERA, Oil Sands Economic Benefits: Today and in the Future (N.p: IHS CERA, January 2014).
http://www.ihs.com/pdfs/OSD-2013-Economic-Benefits-Jan-2-2014.pdf (accessed June 5, 2014)
12 Ibid.
13 Wendy Dobson, China’s State-Owned Enterprises and Canada’s FDI Policy, SPP Research Papers Volume 7, Issue
10. Calgary: The School of Public Policy University of Calgary, March 2014, p. 2.
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/dobson-china.pdf (accessed June 5, 2014) 
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FIGURE 1: HISTORICAL OIL SANDS M&A TRANSACTIONS +,++
+ Source: TD Securities. 
++ Does not include the Nexen acquisition, given less than 50 per cent of Nexen’s resources and current production
was weighted towards oil sands. 
To summarize, the oil and gas industry is capital intensive and CERI forecasts that the oil
sands projects will require $100 billion in capital investment in the next five years. The
Canadian economy relies on foreign investment for almost 20 per cent of assets, and this is
higher at 35 per cent in the oil and gas sector. The extent of SOE investment in the Canadian
oil and gas sector is relatively small but has, until recently, been growing rapidly. SOE
investments have become increasingly important in world investment in resources generally,
and in the energy sector in particular. The next section reviews the revised ICA with respect to
SOE investment and undertakes empirically to estimate the impact of the changes on firms
operating in the oil sands.
Revised Guidelines for Oil Sands Investments by State-Owned Enterprises
The revised guidelines for SOE investment announced on December 7, 2012 were specifically
targeted towards the oil sands sector. Bill C-60, which was introduced on April 29, 2013 and
has since received royal assent, was largely consistent with the initial policy announcement.
The intent of the revised policy guidelines is to require controlling positions in the oil sands to
pass a “net benefit” test.
The salient features of the revised guidelines and legislation are as follows:
• Broadens the definition of SOEs to an entity directly or indirectly controlled by a foreign
government
• Triggers a “net benefit” review of SOE investments in the oil sands for transactions where
the assets of the acquired business have a net book value of more than $354 million. This
threshold is expected to rise on an enterprise-value basis in annual stages for non-SOE
investors, while remaining capped at book value for SOE investments
• Grants the industry minister the discretion to accept or deny any proposed deal 
• Mandates that SOE acquisitions of control of oil sands assets must be on an “exceptional
net benefit” basis only
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A careful reading of these guidelines reveals both more clarity in the rules and more uncertainty.
The clarity comes from making it clear that controlling interests of oil sands firms by SOEs will
not be permitted unless under exceptional circumstances reflecting Prime Minister Harper’s
statement that being open for business does not mean Canada is for sale to foreign governments.
On the other hand, there is greater uncertainty in broadening the definition of what defines an
SOE with respect to the Act, as well as what defines controlling interests. The new policy
increases the discretionary power of the industry minister. Moreover, although the revised policy
clearly focuses on controlling interests, as we discuss above, it is possible that the rule changes
will have a broader impact on financing and investment in the oil sands. How these policy
changes have affected the oil sands industry is the question we turn to now.
ANALYSIS OF STOCK RETURNS OF THE OIL SANDS COMPANIES
We empirically examine the impact on publicly traded firms operating in the oil sands by
analysing the impact on their stock returns. In the empirical analysis, we control for other
factors potentially affecting the stock returns of these firms. Following the standard market
model approach, we control for the overall performance of the market, the risk-free rate of
return and oil prices. We use the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) index as the proxy for the
overall performance of the market. The NYSE has the advantage over the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSX) of additional diversification outside of energy, along with cross-listings of
Canadian firms. For oil prices, two crude streams are incorporated into the analysis: 1) Western
Canadian Select (WCS) spot price, which is the benchmark heavy Canadian blend and most
representative of the heavy oil price received by oil sands producers; and 2) West Texas
Intermediate (WTI), which is the benchmark light sweet North American crude price. Both
commodity prices and equity indices strengthened following the policy change. In light of this
generally more supportive economic environment, the continued deterioration in the junior
sector is striking. This provides prima facie evidence that the change in SOE investment policy
may have disproportionately impacted the junior oil sands group.
Figures 2 and 3 show the equity indices, commodity and oil sands share prices are indexed to
100 at the time of the revised SOE policy guidelines. The senior/intermediate sector appears to
have benefited from a more supportive economic environment, while the junior sector has
continued to demonstrate declining share price returns. In Figure 2, the black line reveals the
continued and steeper decline in share prices of an index of the junior oil sands firms post-
announcement even as oil prices increase. The index of the share prices of intermediate/senior
oil sands firms increases post-announcement. It looks like the share prices of the juniors and
intermediates move together and reflect movements in the oil price prior to the announcement.
Post-announcement, there is a break in the share prices of the junior index.
Figure 3 plots the index of the share prices of the juniors and intermediate/seniors against the
market returns. Again, we see that prior to the announcement, the junior share index was strong up
to mid-2012 and then experienced a correction from over 140 to 100. The share price index was
fairly stable until after December 2012, when the share index declined to below 50 – representing
a 50 per cent decline in the index. Meanwhile, the oil sands intermediate/seniors continued to
perform better than the juniors, and so did the market reflected by the NYSE and the TSX.
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FIGURE 2: OIL SANDS SHARE PRICE+ VERSUS OIL PRICE RETURN
INDEXED TO 100 AT POLICY ANNOUNCEMENT 
+ Oil Sands returns are equally weighted
The patterns in these share indices in Figures 2 and 3 reveal that the share prices of the junior
oil sands firms declined dramatically in the first half of 2013. While the intermediate/senior oil
sands firms fared better, their share prices did not increase in step with the oil prices or with
the general market conditions. In the next section, we use regression analysis to control for the
general market conditions and oil prices. We adopt an event study approach to explore the
impact of the policy change on the stock market returns of the publicly traded oil sands firms. 
FIGURE 3: OIL SANDS SHARE PRICE+ VERSUS EQUITY INDEX RETURN
INDEXED TO 100 AT POLICY ANNOUNCEMENT 
+ Oil Sands returns are equally weighted.
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THE MODEL AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
Economists have long been interested in measuring the impact of policy changes on the value
of firms, often employing an event study approach to do so. According to MacKinlay, the
usefulness of this approach stems from the fact that, given rational markets, the impact of a
policy will be reflected in security prices.14 The approach has been used effectively in a
number of situations.15 
We base our empirical analysis on the research conducted by Sadorsky, who showed that the
stock prices of Canadian oil companies can be determined based on a market rate of return,
such as the TSX and the price of oil.16 We adopt this into a standard event study analysis. We
follow the event study literature and compute abnormal returns using the index of junior
returns and the index of intermediate/senior returns described in the previous section. In
particular, we estimate the following market model:
1.    R Junior Index t =  – 0.002 + 0.906 x RMt + 0.275 x Roilt
(s.e.)       (0.0008)    (0.0829)            (0.0489)
2.    R Intermediate/Senior Index t =  – 0.0003 + 0.790 x RMt + 0.369 x Roilt
(s.e.)                        (0.0004)     (0.044)              0.0259
3.    RAll Firms Index t =  – 0.0012 + 0.845 x RMt + 0.313 x Roilt 
(s.e.)            (0.0006)     (0.058)               (0.034)
where Rt is the rate of return on the index of the daily share prices, RMt is the rate of return on
the market (NYSE) and Roilt is the change in the oil price (WTI). In order to ensure the
explanatory variables are exogenous, we use the NYSE instead of the TSX in our analysis.
(The TSX and NYSE are highly correlated, and therefore, the results are similar when we use
the TSX to conduct the analysis.) We also estimate the equation using different prices for oil.
While we use the WTI in the results reported here, we also checked our analysis using WCS
price and we get qualitatively similar results (not reported here). 
14 Craig A. MacKinlay, “Event studies in economics and finance,” Journal of Economic Literature 35 (1997): 13-39. 
15 To see the approach used to exam the impact of U.S. presidential policies on U.S. firms, see Brian Knight, “Are
policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election,” Journal of
Public Economics 91 (2007): 389–409. For an examination of the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on shipping
companies, see Anthony C. Homan, “The Impact of 9/11 on Financial Risk, Volatility and Returns of Marine Firms,”
Maritime Economics & Logistics 8 (2006) 8:  387–401. For an examination of the impact of changes in cigarette
advertising regulations on tobacco companies, see Douglas J. Lamdin, “Event Studies of Regulation and New Results
on the Effect of the Cigarette Advertising Ban,” Journal of Regulatory Economics 16 (1999): 187-202. For an
examination of the impact of the proposed Canada-US Free Trade Agreement on the stock prices of Canadian firms,
see James A. Brander, “Election Polls, Free Trade, and the Stock Market: Evidence from the 1988 Canadian General
Election,” The Canadian Journal of Economics 24 (1991): 827-843; and Aileen J. Thompson, “Trade Liberalization,
Comparative Advantage, and Scale Economies: Stock Market Evidence from Canada,” Journal of International
Economics 37 (1994): 1-27.
16 Peter Sadorsky, Peter, “Risk Factors in Stock returns of Canadian Oil and Gas companies,” Energy Economics 23
(2001): 17-28.
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For the analysis, we follow the established event study procedure and estimated the equation
separately for the junior index and the intermediate/senior index using daily data from July 28,
2010 to December 7, 2012, which is the day the policy change was announced. We then use
the parameter estimates from the regressions to calculate the abnormal return and cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) for each index.
4.    ARt = Rt – (α + β1 RMt + β3 Roilt)
5.    CAR  = ∑ ARt
where α, β1, and β2 are the estimated parameters from estimating equations 1, 2 and 3. We
compute the abnormal returns separately for the juniors, the intermediate/seniors and all firms
for the post-announcement period and compute the cumulative rate of return. We present the
cumulative abnormal return graphically in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4: CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS POST POLICY ANNOUNCEMENT
The aggregation of abnormal returns, summarized by the cumulative abnormal return over
time, indicates that the policy change had a negative impact on oil sands share returns. In
addition, Figure 4 demonstrates that the juniors were more severely impacted by the SOE
policy change than the intermediate/senior oil sands group.  
Over the month of July 2013, the junior index posted positive, and not negative, abnormal
returns. This can be seen visually in Figure 4 by a sharp reduction in the negative cumulative
abnormal returns. Examining the share trading data, we determine that this can be attributed to
the equally weighted junior index significantly appreciating due to two large day-over-day
company share returns in the sample: 1) Alberta Oil Sands (AOS) increased by 108 per cent
between July 25 and July 26 as a direct result of the cancellation of its Clearwater oil sands
leases and the associated expected compensation from the Alberta government); and 2)
Connacher Oil and Gas (CLL) increased by 171 per cent over the July 16 to July 19 period (the
reason in this case is not clear, but the share appreciation coincided with a sharp increase in
CLL’s trading volume).
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To the extent that these idiosyncratic firm effects are present, the standard event study
approach may not adequately reflect the impact of the policy announcement. This may
positively or negatively bias the magnitude of abnormal returns.17
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Using an event study framework, this paper examines the impact of the federal government’s
policy change towards acquisitions by SOEs on oil sands share returns. We find that the policy
change has had a significant negative impact on the stock returns of oil sands companies.
Further, negative returns attributable to the policy change are much more pronounced for the
junior oil sands group, compared to the intermediate/senior oil sands firms. This is consistent
with our hypothesis that juniors are more likely to be exposed to financing risk due to the fact
they have limited internal cash flow to offset the requirement for external sources of financing.
It is also consistent with the hypothesis that juniors have been adversely affected by the impact
on JVs, an unintended consequence of a policy directed at particular sources of foreign
ownership in the sector.
The findings of this paper indicate the federal government’s policy change has resulted in the
material destruction of shareholder wealth, both directly for those actively investing in the oil
sands and indirectly through oil sands investment allocations in pension plans. However, the
policy change also has broader implications for the real economy. According to Input-Output
analysis by IHS- CERA,18 the oil sands accounted for five per cent of Canadian GDP, $28
billion in government revenue and three per cent of all jobs in Canada in 2012, placing its
economic contribution on par with Saskatchewan, Canada’s fifth largest provincial economy.19
Failure to advance oil sands projects puts employment and social programs at risk. This is the
reality of Canada being a small open economy with a capital-intensive resource sector. The
welfare implications for Canadians of a policy that, to date, has contributed to a less healthy oil
sands sector needs to be carefully considered by policy makers. 
CERI estimates that the oil sands will require approximately $100 billion in investment over
the next five years. While foreign investment in the oil sands is not new, the increased presence
of SOEs is. This raises a number of questions about what the sale of strategic natural resources
means, particularly to China, the assumed target of the government’s policy. Although the rise
of the SOE as a key player in the global energy sector raises some important and legitimate
concerns, the impact of the foreign investment restrictions on oil sands development must be
considered. On this front, it is important to consider the dynamics of the global energy sector.
The 2014 BP Outlook on World Energy predicts that global energy consumption will grow
41 per cent by 2035, with India and China accounting for half of that growth. Over that same
period, BP predicts that the United States will produce 101 per cent of its energy needs. 
17 We address this concern in our technical working paper in which we employ a fixed effects panel regression to
account for firm-level effects to better isolate the impact of the policy change on oil sands share returns. We also
conduct a number of robustness checks and get similar results.
18 IHS CERA, Oil Sands Economic Benefits. 
19 Ibid.
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Moreover, the composition of the global oil industry has changed to one where SOEs dominate
both reserves and production. Given these realities, is this the kind of principled policy stand
Canada can afford to make? Is it feasible for Canada to exclude SOEs from the oil sands, given
that SOEs control the bulk of the world’s proven production and represent the largest players in
the world’s petroleum industry?
Our results indicate that the change in policy has had a negative effect, as measured by the
impact on stock prices, on the industry, particularly the junior oil sands companies. We believe
this will have negative consequences for the future development of the oil sands. A careful
examination of the history of the oil sands reveals the negative consequences of government
policy that restricts access to foreign capital, or that increases uncertainty in the sector.
Research by Chastko and others demonstrates that uncertainty is the greatest deterrent to
development in the industry. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, both the federal and provincial
governments insisted on retaining the right to alter the royalty and taxation provisions of oil
sands projects on a case-by-case basis. It was not until the 1995 National Oil Sands Task Force
adopted a universal standard that oil sands development really took off. The current policy
directed at SOE investment in the oil sands has had a similar chilling effect on the industry and
may impact development as similar policies did in the past.
Given the results from our analysis of this natural experiment, we hope that we have shed some
light on the implications of the current policy – contributing to a lively, and hopefully more
informed, policy debate that is currently underway.
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